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Summary findings
Bond  presents  a tariff  index  that  uses  constant-elasticity-  which  allows  large  amounts  of detailed  tariff  line  data to
of-substitution  aggregators  of tariff  line data  to calculate  be aggregated  for use with  domestic  production  data  that
how  preferential  tariff  reductions  affect  both  prices  and  is available  only at  a more  aggregated  level.
average  tariff  rates.  Bond  finds  that  results  using  the tariff  aggregators  may
A simple general-equilibrium  model  with  sector-  differ substantially  from  those  derived  using  simple
specific factors  of production  can  be combined  with  the  averages  of tariff  reductions.  Reductions  in import  prices
tariff  indices  to calculate  how  a preferential  trade  using  the  index  were  10 to  30 percent  larger  than  those
arrangement  affects sectoral  output,  factor  prices,  and  calculated  using a simple average  of tariffs.  Ignoring  the
general  welfare.  The  general  equilibrium  model  is simple  information  available  in tariff  line  data  could  lead to a
enough  that  it  can be calculated  on an Excel  spreadsheet,  substantial  overestimate  of the  average  tariff  rate  on
and  is flexible  enough  to be used  with  different  ranges  of  imports  after  a preferential  reduction.
available  domestic  data.  The  tariff  index  could  be extended  to incorporate  the
Bond  presents  an example  of the  model,  simulating  the  role of quantitative  restructions.  The  general  equilibrium
effects  of free trade  agreements  between  Chile  and  nmodel could  be used  to consider  the effects  on domestic
MERCOSUR  countries  and between  Chile  and NAFTA  production  of allowing  reallocation  of capital  between
countries.  industries  over time.
Calculations  for  the  case of Chile  show  that  the index
is simple  to calculate  because  of its recursive  structure,
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As regional trading arrangements (RTAs)  have spread, enlarged and deepened over the last
decade, they have posed challenges to economists on both intellectual and policy levels. On the
former, do RTAs stimulate growth and investment, facilitate technology transfer, shift comparative
advantage towards high value-added activities, provide credibility to reform programs, or induce
political stability and cooperation? Or do they, on the other hand, divert trade in inefficient
directions and undermine the multilateral trading system?
The answer is probably "all of these things, in different proportions according to the
particular circumstances of each RTA." This then poses the policy challenge of how best to
manage RTAs in order to get the best balance of benefits and costs. For example, should technical
standards be harmonized and, if so, how; do direct or indirect taxes need to be equalized; how
should RTAs manage their international  trade policies in an outward-looking fashion?
Addressing these issues is one important focus of the research program of the International
Trade Division of the World Bank. It has produced a number of methodological innovations in the
traditional area of trade effects of RTAs and is now starting to tackle four new areas of research: the
dynamics of regionalism (e.g., convergence,  growth, investment, industrial location and migration),
deep integration (standards, tax harmonization), regionalism and the rest of the world (including its
effects on the multilateral trading system), and certain political economy dimensions of regionalism
(e.g., credibility and the use of RTAs as tools of diplomacy).
In addition to thematic work, the program includes a number of studies of specific regional
arrangements, conducted in collaboration with the Regional Vice Presidencies of the Bank.  Several
EU-Mediterranean Association Agreements have been studied and a joint program with the staff of
the Latin American and Caribbean Region entitled "Making  the Most of Mercosur"  is under way.
Future work is planned on African and Asian regional integration schemes.
Regionalism and Development findings have been and will, in future, be released in a
number of outlets. Recent World Bank Policy Research Working Papers concerning these issues
include:
Glenn Harrison, Tom Rutherford and David Tarr, "Economic Implications for Turkey
of a Customs Union with the European Union," (No. 1599).
Maurice Schiff, "Small is Beautiful, Preferential Trade Agreements and the Impact of
Country Size, Market Share, Efficiency and Trade Policy," (No. 1668).
L. Alan Winters, "Regionalism versus Multilateralism," (No. 1687).
Planned future issues in this series include:
Sherry Stephenson, "Standards, Conformity Assessments and Developing Countries"
Maurice Schiff and L. Alan Winters, "Regional Integration  as Diplomacy"Magnus Blomstrom and Ar Kokko, "Regional Integration and Foreign Direct
Investment: A Conceptual Framework and Three Cases"
Magnus Blomstr6m and Ari Kokko, "The Impact of Foreign Investment on Host
Countries: A Review of Empirical Evidence"
Anthony Venables and Diego Puga, "Trading Arrangements and Industrial
Development"
L. Alan Winters and Won Chang, "Integration and Non-Member Welfare: Measuring
the Price Effects"
Glenn Harrison, Thomas Rutherford and David Tarr, "Trade Policy Options for Chile:
A Quantitative Evaluation"
In addition, Making the Most of Mercosur will be issuing papers over the next few months,
including:
Alexander J. Yeats, "Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Raise Concerns About the
Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements?"
Claudio Frischtak, Danny M. Leipziger and John F. Normand, "Industrial Policy in
Mercosur: Issues and Lessons"
Sam Laird (WTO), "Mercosur Trade Policy: Towards Greater Integration"
Margaret Miller and Jerry Caprio, "Empirical Evidence on the Role of Credit for SME
Exports in Mercosur"
Malcom Rowat, "Competition Policy within Mercosur"
For copies of these papers or information about these programs contact Maurice Schiff, The
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20433.
An additional major outlet for World Bank-sponsored  research on regionalism will be the
Annual Bank Conference on Development in Latin America, 1997, Montevideo, June 30-July 2,
1997, organized by the Office of the Chief Economist and the Technical Department for Latin





.i.This paper presents a model for analyzing  the effects of entry into a preferential  trading
arrangement  on the welfare of a small open economy,  and reports results of its application  to the case
of Chile's entry into NAFTA or MERCOSUR. It has been known since  the seminal  work of Viner
(1950)  that entry into a preferential  trading arrangement  (customs  union or free trade area) has an
ambiguous  effect on welfare. The benefit obtained  from entry into a preferential  trading arrangement
is an empirical  question  that must be decided from the characteristics  of the member countries  and
their trade patterns.  Unfortunately,  the concepts  of trade creation  and trade diversion  that Viner used
to describe the effects of a customs  union do not in general  have direct interpretations  as components
of welfare measures  obtained from utility maximization.' Therefore, it is necessary  to develop a
measure of the effects of preferential  tariff reductions  that has a direct welfare interpretation.
The model presented in this paper consists of two components. The first is an aggregation
procedure for creating  aggregate  import  goods from data on trade volumes  and tariff rates at the tariff
line level available in the SMART  system. This aggregation  procedure  is based on the assumption
that imports  are separable from domestic  production  and consumption. This approach  is similar to
that adopted by Anderson  and Neary (1991)  and Anderson  (1991), who develop index numbers for
summarizing  the effects  of a country's tariff structure. In order to apply  this approach  to tariff
reductions  that discriminate  between  countries, we extend  these tariff indices  by allowing  for
imperfect substitutability  between  goods in the same tariff line classification  that come from different
countries. The aggregation  procedure  uses nested  constant  elasticity  of substitution  (CES) functions,
which allows for the substitutability  between  products from different  countries (in the same category)
to differ from that of products in different  categories. This aggregation  procedure  yields two
components:  a measure of the effect of preferential  tariff cuts on the relative  price of the composite
imported goods and a measure  of the average tariff rate on the composite  goods.
The second component  is a general equilibrium  model of the domestic  economy  which uses
the changes in the composite  import  prices and average  tariff rates from the CES aggregation  tocalculate  the effects of tariff changes  on domestic  activity levels, tariff revenue, and welfare. This
model is designed  to be sufficiently  simple  that it can be calculated  on an EXCEL  spreadsheet,  and to
be flexible  enough to allow  application  under differing  degrees of availability  of domestic  data.  The
spreadsheet  model yields an index  of the effect of the preferential  tariff reductions  which is dependent
on the assumptions  made regarding the domestic  production  structure.
The structure of this model reflects the desire to combine  information  on tariffs and trade
volumes,  which is available  at a very fine levels of product classification,  with data on domestic input
usage and consumption,  which is available  only at much more highly  aggregated  levels. By assuming
separability  between domestically  produced  goods (traded  and non-traded)  and imported goods in the
production functions  and utility function, we are able to combine  data from these two different
sources and obtain simple measures  of the welfare  effects of preferential  tariff cuts.  Chile presents an
interesting  example  application  of the model for several  reasons. First, the initial tariff structure in
Chile is essentially  a uniform external  tariff.  The literature  on tariff reform (Hatta (1977), Corden
(1984))  has suggested  that under certain conditions,  welfare improvements  can be obtained  by either
(i) a proportional reduction  in all tariffs or (ii) tariff changes  that move in the direction  of a uniform
external tariff (e.g. a reduction in the highest  tariff rate and an increase in the lower tariff rate).  This
raises questions about the benefit of entry into a preferential  trading arrangement  for Chile, since it
results in a movement  away from a uniform  external  tariff.  Second,  the availability  of two alternative
preferential  trading arrangements  has the potential  to provide insights  about which types of
preferential trading arrangements  would be most desirable.
I.  Aggregation  of Trade Data
In this section, we present a procedure  for aggregating  tariff line level data using nested CES
functions  that is compatible  with domestic  data on consumption  and input use.  The trade data consists
of import values and base tariff rates for N tariff lines from H different source countries.  We will
2assume imports from different countries  are imperfect  substitutes,  and that the importing  country is a
small country in world markets. These  assumptions  ensure that a change in tariff policy, whether it
applies  to all goods in a particular  tariff line or only those from a particular source country, will have
no effect on the world prices of any of the imported goods. The domestic  production  data is assumed
to contain data on imports  in  IM  product categories,  which are used as intermediate  inputs in
domestic production  and/or as consumption  goods. The problem is to aggregate  the NxH import
values to IM  composite  imported  goods.
The aggregation  problem for a particular  product category  i is illustrated  in Figure 1.  The
nodes at the top (denoted  by a I) of the Figure represent  the value of imports  in industry  i, denoted
Mi, that are utilized as intermediate  inputs or consumption  goods in industry  i in the domestic  data.
The entries at the bottom of the Figure correspond  to the trade data, which is the value of imports by
tariff line and source country. We will develop  a quantity  index, Z 1, and a price index, j,  for each
sector i such that Zioi = Mi.  In addition, we will obtain an index  of the average tariff rate, tj , such
that tariff revenue for each sector i is ti Zi.  The effect of tariff policy changes  on 4, and t, will then
be utilized in the general equilibrium  model to calculate  the effect on domestic  output, employment,
and welfare.
Nested CES aggregation  is used to allow  for different  degrees of substitution  within product
categories  than between  product categories. First, we allow for the possibility  that goods in the same
industry group have a different degree of substitutability  for each other than for goods in another
industry group.  In the example  illustrated  in Figure 1, this is done by dividing  each of the industry
groups into J; subgroups. Each tariff line is then classified  into an industry and a sub-industry. This
results in each tariff line being identified  by a triple {i,j,k},  where i is an indicator  of the industry to
which it belongs, j is an indicator  of the sub-industry  to which it belongs, and k is an indicator  of the
tariff line within the sub-industry.  Second, we allow for the possibility  of different degrees  of
3substitutability  between  goods from different country  groups. For example,  we can let goods from
high income countries be better substitutes  for each other than for imports from low income countries
in the same product category. This is accomplished  by dividing  countries into groups, and assigning
each source country  to a country group. Each country  will thus be identified  by a pair {l,m}, where 1
is an indicator  of the country group to which it belongs  and m is an indicator  of the country  within
the country group.
The trade data on import values  from a particular  source country  in a particular tariff line are
denoted  by Mijk,l  at the bottom of Figure 1, where the {ijk}  subscripts  identify the tariff line and the
{lm} subscripts  identify the source country.  The tariff rates imposed  on imports from that product
category and country  can sirnilarly  be identified  by y-jk,,.  The aggregation  proceeds  by first
aggregating  over imports  within a particular  country group, as indicated  by node IV in Figure 1.  The
trade value  Kw  =  S  M1 ikhn  represents  the value of imports from country  group 1 in tariff line
m
{i,j,k}, with Oijkl  the price index  for this group and Zijk the quantity index. The data on imports  from
country groups at node IV is then aggregated  over the groups  within the tariff line to yield a price
index  Oijk  and quantity index Zijk for the tariff line (at node III).  The tariff lines within each sub-
industry are then aggregated  to yield indices  for the sub-industry  (node II), and the sub-industry
indices are aggregated  to obtain the industry  aggregate  at node I.
The aggregation  structure  is quite flexible, and can be extended  to allow for any number of
levels of industry and/or country groups. The application  to Chile considered  in this section provides
an example  of how the aggregation  can be carried out.  The trade volume data from Chile consist of
1011  tariff lines at the 4-digit (CCCN)  level for the year 1986. This trade data had to be aggregated
to 41 different  product categories,  which represented  the industries  for which import usage data were
4available in the input-output  table of the Chilean economy  for 1986.2 The aggregation  first
accomplished  by dividing  these 41 industries  into sub-industries  using SITC classifications,  leading  to
a total of 113 sub industries  (corresponding  to the number  of nodes at level II in Figure 1).  Each of
the tariff lines (nodes  at level III) was then assigned  to a subindustry  using an CCCN/ SITC
concordance. To allow differing  degrees  of substitutability  between  different types of countries, the
source countries  were divided into three groups: OECD countries, Latin American countries, and the
rest of the world.  There were thus a total of 3,033 nodes at level IV in Figure 1, resulting  from 3
country  groups for each of the tariff lines.
At each node, a CES aggregator is used to derive a quantity  and price index from the price
and quantity indices  at the lower level nodes.  For example,  let A denote a representative  node and let
Ai be the nodes that are connected  to A at the next lower level of aggregation. We want to develop
an aggregate  index  for node A, ZA  from the indices  ZA  calculated  at the lower level nodes. The
aggregate  quantity at node A will be
a  A-I
ZA  k  jA{ZA?  GA  (1)
where aA E  [0,  oo) is the elasticity  of substitution  between  imports from the different inputs to node.3
The parameters  bA  are included  to allow for the possibi
lity of quality differences  between  goods  from different input sources.  The corresponding  price
index for goods at node A will be
5  A  (2)where  'A,  is the price  index of goods from the component groups that make up the aggregate at
node A.
This aggregation  structure implies that the share of total expenditure on imports at node A that come
from category Ai will be
____=  +  Z  = (b  AJA  (3)
Equations (1)-(3) summarize the quantity, price, and expenditure share at a representative node.
In practice,  data on the value of trade in each category is normally available but data on the
quantities of imports are unavailable or unreliable.  This means that it will not be possible to
separately identify the  bA4  parameters from the data.  Therefore, there  is no loss of generality  in
normalizing prices of all imports to 1 in the initial situation.  Under the assumption that the country
in question is small and that goods from different source countries are imperfect substitutes, the
domestic price  of the imported goods in the tariff line data will be  (1+  j  ) q*,,  where q*,  is the
exogenously given foreign price of goods in the tariff  line with index ijk from the country whose
index is Im and  r°jjkhn  is the ad valorem tariff imposed in the initial situation.  The normalization of
domestic prices to 1 in the initial situation is thus a normalization of world prices to  1/(1  + i'ijkh,,)  in
the initial situation.  Assuming that prices in the rest of the world remain unchanged, the new
domestic price  will be Ojk,n,=  (1 + Tlj,k,,)/  (1 +°i7jj,,), where r!j,l, is the new tariff rate  .
Under this normalization,  *A  =  1 for all nodes A and sub-indices i in the initial situation
6and the  bA,  parameters  can be derived from the expenditure  shares in the initial situation  (denoted
by a 0 superscript)  to be  PA,  =  =  bloA  From (2), the price index for the effect of the tariff
change at node A will be
A  [  PAj(A)  ]OA]  '-OA  (4)
Note that for AA  =  0, (4) becomes  a simple  weighted  average of the price changes  within  the
category, where the weights are equal to the shares of the value of trade of the respective  products
within the category.
The aggregation  procedure thus consists  of calculating  the price index  (4) at each of the nodes
for a particular change in the tariff structure. Note that if the tariff cut were a uniform cut such that
(l  +  T!dk,,)  =  X (I +70ijkn,) for all i,j,k,l, and m, then  X,  =  X. Thus, O, can be interpreted  as
indicating  the uniform tariff cut in category i that would have the same effect on import prices as the
tariff policy change  being considered.  Note also that In  cf  will be an approximation  of the
percentage change  in import prices in industry i resulting  from this uniform  tariff cut.
A.  Trade Shares and Average  Tariff Rates
Once the effects of tariff cuts on the price indices  have been calculated,  the price indices can
be used to calculate  the effect of the tariff changes  on the trade shares in the product categories  and
on tariff revenue. Using (3), the share of imports  in product category A coming  from the
subcategory  with index i will be
7I3= 0 J(-Ai
PiA'j =  PAi-  (5)
When the elasticity of substitution  is greater (less) than one, the expenditure  on imports in a particular
sub-category as a share of imports  in the total category  will rise (fall) if the price of imports in that
category falls relative to the price of goods in the category as a whole.
Now consider  the effect of the change  in tariff structure on tariff revenue. Under the
normalization  we have adopted, each unit of good {ijklm}  imported  yields tariff revenue of
ti  - qi  =  . We can then derive the tariff revenue collected from a unit of
"  .ijk1n
expenditure  at node A, denoted  tA,  to be the weighted  average of tariff revenues  of the components
Ai, where the weights are the respective  trade shares.
tA =  PtA,3  (6)
Similar calculations  can be performed  at each node in Figure 1 to yield the tariff revenue  generated
by an additional  unit of expenditure  at that node.
Starting from an initial tariff structure  for industry i as summarized  by  t°, the pair (i,tj!)
captures the effect of the change  in the tariff structure  on imports  in industry i.  This means that any
two changes  in the tariff structure  that yielded  the same values (0i,t!) would have the same effect on
composite  import prices and tariff revenue  from the composite  goods  in industry i.
B. An Application  to Chile
In this section  we illustrate  the calculation  of the import  price indices  to capture the effects on
relative prices in Chile of eliminating  tariffs on MERCOSUR  and NAFTA countries. Table 1 reports
the calculations  of the impacts for the 15 largest import sectors (out of the total of 41 sectors
8calculated)  as well as the trade-weighted  average over all 41 sectors.  Column 1 reports the shares of
the respective  industries  in total imports  in 1986. These trade shares indicate  that Chile's imports
were concentrated  in manufactured  goods, particularly  capital-intensive  or R&D intensive  sectors.
Imports from 5 of these industries (chemicals,  electrical  machinery,  transportation  equipment  and
basic metals) account  for 55% of imports. Column  2 shows  that the tariff structure rates prior to
entry into preferential  arrangements,  denoted  BASE  rate, was virtually  a uniform tariff of 11  %.
Column  3 shows the tariff rate by import category, NEW rate, calculated  using a simple trade-
weighted  average of all goods in each of the product  categories.  Table 1 shows that reducing  tariffs
on MERCOSUR  members  has a relatively  small effect on the overall average tariff rate over all
imports, which falls from 11% to 9.4%.  Entry into MERCOSUR  has a significant  impact  on the
average tariff rate in 8 of the individual  product  categories,  where the tariff rates fall to below 10%.
The significant  cuts occur primarily  in industries  associated  with agricultural  production (meat,
leather, tobacco, sugar) and simple manufacturing  processes  associated  with agriculture  (leather, oils
and fats, and processed vegetables). However, these products  represent a relatively small volume  of
Chile's trade, with none making  the list of the 15 largest sectors.  Therefore,  the overall effect on the
average is quite small.  Column  4 converts  the tariff cut into a percentage  reduction in the price of
imports, using the formula ln(1  +BASE)-In  (1  +NEW).  This tariff cut averages  about 1.4% for
MERCOSUR,  compared  with a cut of 10.4% (i.e. In (1.11)) if the tariff rate had been cut to 0 on all
imports.
Columns  5 and 6 present calculations  of the price index under two alternative  assumptions
regarding the elasticity  of substitution. For column 6, referred to as the high elasticity  assumption,  it
was assumed  that a;  =  .9 , aij =  2,  ij  k  =  16, and aijd = 32 for all i, j ,k,  1. The value of 16 for
the country group level was obtained  by taking the average of elasticities  estimated  by Grossman
(1982)  between developed  country  (DC) and less developed  country  (LDC) imports in the US.  The
9remaining  elasticities  were chosen by assuming  that substitution  would be greater at lower levels in
the aggregation  structure in Figure 1.  These assumptions  yielded reductions  in the price of the
composite imports  of as much  as 3-4% in some of the significant  sectors. The average reduction  in
the price of imports  of 2.2%, which is 50% more than the price cut obtained  using the simple
weighted  average measure in Column  4.  This would be equivalent  to a uniform external  tariff of
8.6%.  The reason for this difference  is that the CES structure  allows more substitution  toward
imports that are treated preferentially  than does the simple  weighted  average, which results in a larger
reduction in the effective  price of imports. Column  5 shows  the results obtained  if the elasticities  take
the values ai  =  .9, oaj =  2,  7ijk  = 4, and uijz  = 8, which is referred to as the low elasticity
assumption. In this case the elasticities  at the country level were taken to be one-quarter  of those in
the high elasticity  assumption,  which are closer to those typically  used in CGE models. 4 Under the
low elasticity assumption,  the tariff cut is equivalent  in a reduction  in the external  tariff to a uniform
value of 9.2%, which is only slightly  lower than the value of 9.4% obtained  with the simple weighted
average. Under either set of elasticity  assumptions,  the effects on import  prices of reducing tariffs on
MERCOSUR  members is much smaller than that obtained  from a complete  elimination  of tariffs.
Table 2 shows that the tariff cut for NAFTA would  be more significant,  with the simple
average tariff falling to 8.3%.  The effects  of entry into NAFTA are more evenly distributed  across
import categories  than are the MERCOSUR  cuts, with most of the average tariff rates still exceeding
7 % under NAFTA. In only two of the product categories  does the average  tariff under NAFTA fall
below 5  %.  However, the effect on the average tariff rate is more significant because of the larger
trade volume with NAFTA countries.  The average drop in import prices using the simple weighted
average is 2.5 % (Column  4).  Using  the CES aggregation,  the cut is equivalent  to 3.62% using the
higher elasticity  assumption  in Column  6, and 2.8% under the lower under the lower elasticity
assumption.  These are equivalent  to reductions  in the uniform  external  tariff to 7% and 8%
10respectively.
Table 3 shows the effects  of the respective  tariff cuts on the tariff revenue per dollar of
expenditure  on import good i, ti.  Column  2 shows  the value in the initial situation, where the
uniform external  tariff of 11  % yields a value of  t = (0.11/1.11) =  .099.  Columns  3 and 4 show the
effect on average tariff rates of elimination  of tariffs on MERCOSUR  countries  under the low and
high values for the elasticity  of substitution,  respectively. For the low value, the values of ti for the
major categories  fall in the range of 7-9%, with the simple  weighted  average across all sectors
equaling 8.2%.  Under the high assumption  regarding  elasticities  of substitution,  many of the tariff
rates are in the 5-8  % range and the average falls to 7.1 %.  Average  tariff rates for entry into NAFTA
were lower than those for MERCOSUR,  with the average rate falling to 7.1 % under the low
elasticity assumption  and 5.4% under the high elasticity  assumption.
One interesting  point to note regarding  these calculations  is that when tariff cuts are
preferential, the uniform tariff equivalents  of the t. and Oi  are not the same. To see this, consider
imports of coal under NAFTA. Using the high elasticity  assumption,  Table 2 shows that entry into
NAFTA results in a 6.5% reduction  in the price of coal imports  (i.e. f  = 0.937).  Since a cut in the
uniform tariff from .11 to r yields a value of 0  =  (1  +  r)l 1.  1  1, a value of 0  =  .937 translates  to a
new uniform  tariff of 4 % (i.e. r  =  (.937)(1.11) - 1  =  .04).  Table 3 shows that this cut yields an
average tariff of 2.7% per dollar of imports, which is equivalent  to a uniform external  tariff of
(2.7/(1 -.027)) = 2.77%.  Similar calculations  for the other import  categories  indicate  that the
uniform  tariff equivalents  of the tj are consistently  less than those of the ck,.
A possible explanation  for this example  can be seen using a simple example  in which there
are only two source countries  for an imported  good, and there is no substitutability  between  source
countries. Letting Oi  be the share of imports  from country i (i =  1,2), the value of the import price
11index for this case will be  4(0 1 ' 2)  =  1 °  +  z  2),  where a 0 superscript  denotes  the
initial tariff rate.  Note in particular  that for given initial  tariff rates this index depends only on the
import-weighted  average value of the new tariffs (denoted  X  ), and not on the variance of the rates.
The average tariff rate will be  t(Tl,T 2)  =  01  )  +.  Since r/ (l+r)  is a concave
function of T7, it follows from Jensen's inequality  that t(T1 ,  r)  <  t(s,r)  . This shows that the
value calculated  using the actual tariff data will be lower than that calculated  using the trade-weighted
average tariff  when the tariff cut is not uniform, which means that the measure t depends on the
variance  of tariff rates even when the elasticity  of substitution  is 0.  For cases in which a  >  0 this
comparison  becomes  more complicated,  because  0 is no longer linear in T.  However, the calculations
above  suggests  that the direction  of the bias continues  to hold for Chile in this case as well.  This
highlights  the fact that calculation  of the price index for imports  is not sufficient  for calculating  the
average tariff rate when tariffs are not uniform. It also suggests  that the failure to use the tariff line
data could result of overestimates  of average  tariff rates, if these average tariffs are estimated  using
the average price reduction on imported goods  resulting  from a tariff cut.
Two general conclusions  emerge from the values  of the O,  and ti calculated  for Chile.  First,
the effect of eliminating  tariffs on imports  from NAFTA countries  is more significant  than the effect
of eliminating  tariffs on MERCOSUR  countries. Second, the effect of these reductions  was more
12significant  under the high elasticity  assumption  than under the low elasticity  assumption. This result
held for both measures  of tariff reductions.
II. The General Equilibrium  Model of the Domestic  Economy
In this section we present a simple general equilibrium  model  to use with the aggregated  tariff
indices calculated  in the previous section, and use this model to calculate  the impact  of the tariff
changes  on factor prices, consumption  levels, and welfare in Chile. The objective  in formulating  this
general equilibrium  model is to make the model sufficiently  rich that it is capable  of capturing  the
effects of tariff changes  on consumption  decisions  and resource allocation  between  production sectors,
while keeping the model simple enough  that it can be calculated  on an EXCEL spreadsheet. The
specification  of the model presented  here is based on the data used for the case of Chile, but the
formulation  can easily be adjusted  to allow greater or lesser detail as dictated  by the availability  of
data.  The data for domestic  production  was obtained from the input/output  table for Chile for 1986,
which contained  data on the value of output, labor input, domestically  produced  intermediate  inputs,
and imported intermediate  inputs for domestic  production  sectors. Data on domestic  consumption  by
sector was also available, with consumption  broken down  between  domestic  and imported  goods.
This data was used to parameterize  a specific factors  general equilibrium  model of the production
structure.
A. The Model
In this section we present a general equilibrium  production  model for the domestic  economy.
We will divide  the domestic  production  sector into two types of goods: traded and non-traded  goods.
Let IT denote the total number  of traded goods sectors, and IN  the number of non-traded  goods
sectors.  For non-traded  goods, all output is sold in the domestic  market and the price of output  will
be endogenously  determined  by equating  local production  to domestic  demand. For traded goods,
13output  can be sold in the domestic  market and the world market. We will assume  that the price of
traded goods sold in the world market is exogenously  given, but that the price of traded goods sold in
the domestic  market is endogenously  determined  because  exports and domestic sales are imperfect
substitutes.
For each sector i, output (Y 1) is produced  using labor (L.), capital (K.) and intermediate  inputs
from sectors  j (Xij,  j  E  N,T).  Capital  is assumed  to be sector-specific,  so that K1  is exogenously
given in each sector, while labor is assumed  to be mobile between  sectors.  The production  function
for each sector is assumed  to take the CES form, and is given  by
F  o-l  -1  aI
Yi  =  i  +(bLA)  'i  +  E  (bSYX) 'J  (7a)
where the parameters  bji  are technological  parameters  reflecting  the productivity  of a unit of input  j
and ai is the elasticity  of substitution  between  inputs.  For inputs from non-traded  goods sectors  j, the
input consists entirely of domestically  produced  goods. For inputs from traded goods sectors  j,  the
intermediate  input Xji  is a composite  good made up of imported  goods, Xmji,  and domestically
produced  goods, Xdji,  according  to the relationship
Xii  =  (bdjiXdji)  +  +(bijX=mji)  I  y  (7b)
For sectors where traded goods are produced, the output  may be sold either in the domestic market,
Ydi, or exported to the world market, Y,i. We assume  that domestic  and export sales are imperfect
substitutes  from the firm's point of view, so that for firms producing  traded goods the output Yi is a
composite good representing  the combination  of domestic  and export sales,
14i+a,z  1+o  A  %
Yi  =  (mdyd)  i  + (mJY ) i  o:+1  (7c)
Imperfect  substitutability  between  domestic  sales and export sales can arise due to differences  in
quality or product characteristics  between  goods sold to domestic  and foreign consumers,  or because
of transportation  and packaging  costs required for export sales.
Consumer's preferences are assumed  to be represented  by a CES utility function
r  ~  IC,OCl
U  (a 1D,)  a  (8a)
where a,  are taste parameters  and ac is the elasticity  of substitution  in consumption  for final goods.
For traded goods, it is assumed  that imports are imperfect  substitutes  for domestically  produced  goods
in the same sector. The consumption  of a traded good, Di for i E  T, is a composite  good defined to
be
aci-1~ Z~I
D  |  c(ad 1Di)  + (amiD)  Oa  (8b)
where D,i, (Ddi)  is the consumption  of imported  (domestically  produced  consumption  goods), a.. (adi)
is the taste parameter for imported (domestic)  consumption  goods, and aci  is the elasticity  of
substitution  between imported  and domestically  produced  consumption  goods in sector i.  By setting
rci  >  ac we obtain a greater degree of substitutability  between  domestically  produced  goods and
imported goods in the same sector than between goods  from different sectors.  Consumption  levels
are chosen to maximize  the utility function  (8), subject to the constraint  that the level of expenditure,
E,  not exceed the income of households. This yields the budget constraint
15E  Di =  riKi + wL + B  + St4jD11 +  X  )  (9)
ieN,T  ieN,T  ier  jEN,T
where the aggregate  household  income is the sum of factor incomes  (earnings  of sector-specific  capital
and labor), borrowing, and tariff revenue. The tariff rates t. in (9) are the tariff rates for the
composite  imports derived from the tariff line aggregation  in Section  I, while ri is the rental on a unit
of capital in sector i and w is the wage rate.  The supplies  of sector-specific  capital and labor are
taken as exogenously  given, as is the level of borrowing.
The prices of exports from the home country  traded goods producers, p,j  for i E  T, the price
of imported inputs purchased  by N firms and T firms, and the price of imported consumption  goods
are all taken as exogneously  given  by the small  country assumption. The prices traded goods sold in
the domestic market and the price of non-traded  goods will be determined  endogenously,  as will the
returns to the domestic factors of production. We will briefly describe  the equilibrium  conditions  for
the domestic factor markets and goods markets  which are solved as part of the spreadsheet  model.
The complete  derivation  of the market-clearing  conditions  from the maximization  problems  of firms
and households  is presented in the Appendix.
The linkage between  the goods  markets and factor markets is shown in Figure 2, which
illustrates a case in which there is only a single  traded good sector, T, and a single  non-traded
sector, N.  Consider first the factor markets. In the labor market, the fixed stock of labor must be
allocated  between  employment  in traded and non-traded  goods sectors. Let L1(w,p,O, K,) denote the
demand for labor in sector i, which is derived  from cost minimization  problem of the firm given the
wage rate, stock of sector-specific  capital, the vector of prices of domestic  goods (p) and the vector of
prices of imported  goods (q).  The equilibrium  condition  requires that the sum of the sectoral
demands  equal the endowment  of labor, L.
16Lj(w,p,f,K 1)  = L  (10)
ieN,T
Since  capital is sector-specific  and fixed in supply, its return can be determined  from the zero profit
conditions  of the firm.  Given output  price and the prices of intermediate  inputs and labor, the return
to capital will be determined  by the condition  that price equal unit cost of production. These
conditions  can be expressed  as
ri =  ri(p,,(1w)
Next consider  the goods  markets. The demand  for non-traded  good i comes  from the
household demand for i as consumption  goods, Di, and the sum over production  sectors  j of demand
for i as an input  E  Xdij . Sector  j's  demand  function  for intermediate  inputs from sector i are
jeN,T
derived from the cost-minimization  problem of the firm, Xij(w,p,o, Kj). The supply of the non-traded
good is similarly  obtained  from the optimization  of firms in sector i, Yi(w,p,o, Ki).  The (Hicksian)
demand  functions  for the non-traded  good for final consumption  is derived from the consumer
optimization  problem, Di(p,o, U), where U is aggregate  utility. Combining  these  behavioral
relations, we obtain the market-clearing  condition  for non-traded  goods sector i to be
for i E  N  (12a)
Di(p,IU)  +  E  X, 1 (p,4,w,K)  = Y 1(p,fw,K1)
jEN,T
A similar market-clearing  conditions  exists for domestic  sales of traded goods, except that we allow
for substitutability  between  domestic  goods and imports  in consumption  and intermediate  demand, and
for substitution  between  domestic  sales and export  sales in production. The market-clearing  condition
17for this case will be
Ddi(p,p,U) +  ,  Xdi(p,P,w,K)  =  Ydi(p,4w,K)  for i  E  T  (12b)
jeN,T
In summary, equations  (10)-(12)  yield 2(IN  +  IT)  +  1 market-clearing  conditions. These
equations  contain 2(IN  +  IT) + 2 unknowns: the IN  prices of non-traded  goods, IT prices of domestic
traded goods output, IT +  IN returns to sector-specific  capital, the wage rate, and the level of
aggregate  utility.  The remaining  condition  is obtained  by noting that for the utility function (8), the
level of aggregate  utility is equal to expenditure  deflated  by a price index,
E = dcU  (13)
where  c is the price index associated  with the CES utility function. Substituting  this condition in the
budget constraint  (9) yields the last equation.
Now suppose  that there is trade liberalization,  which lowers the prices of imported
consumption  and intermediate  goods. At the initial equilibrium  prices and utility level, consumers
substitute  away from domestically  produced  goods  and toward imported  goods, which would reduce
final goods  demand and tend to create excess supply of traded and non-traded  goods in (12).  Also,
the reduction  in the price of imported  inputs will raise the supply of domestically  produced goods at
initial  prices, which also tends to create excess supply  in (12).  However, the effect of the tariff
reduction  on the demand  for domestic  goods as intermediates  is ambiguous:  the increasing  scale of
domestic  production  will tend to raise intermediate  demand,  but the lower price of imports  will result
in substitution  away from domestically  produced  inputs and toward imported  inputs.  In the labor
market, the reduction in tariffs on imported  goods  will raise the profitability  of production  at fixed
output  prices, which raises the demand  for labor. Prices of domestic factors and goods will adjust  to
eliminate  the disequilibrium  created  by the trade liberalization.
18It is clear that the direction  of the change in prices of domestic  goods and factors cannot be
detennined  a priori.  For example,  the above  discussion  suggested  that the excess demand  for labor at
initial prices would put upward pressure on the wage rate.  However, if the price of domestic  goods
declines, as seems likely if the domestic  goods  are good substitutes  for imports, the demand  for labor
will be reduced. Thus, wages and goods prices could  either rise or fall in the final equilibrium. The
discussion  of the model does suggest  several factors  that are likely to affect the magnitude  of the price
changes. First, markets with greater levels of imports  for final consumption  and directly competing
imported intermediates  are likely to experience  declines  in prices, since there will be greater
substitution  away from domestic  goods. This will also reduce the returns to owners of specific
factors in these sectors, because of the decline in output  price.  Second, prices are also likely to fall
in sectors where significant  levels of imported  inputs are used, because  the reduction  in production
cost will increase supply. In these sectors specific  factor owners  will increase incomes,  though,
because  the cost of inputs declines relative  to the price of output. In this case imports  will be a
complement  to domestic  production  rather than a substitute. Third, the impact  on domestic  prices is
likely to be larger the greater is the elasticity  of substitution  between  domestic  goods and imported
goods. Finally, the impact  on prices is likely to be small when there is a significant  level of
exporting  and a high elasticity  of substitution  between  domestic  sales and export sales.
We now turn to a parameterization  of the model  for the case of Chile, to illustrate  how a
preferential tariff reduction affects  domestic  prices once equilibrium  has been restored in all markets.
B. Simulation  Results  for Chile
The domestic  production  data for Chile contained  information  on 69 domestic  production
sectors for Chile.  Of these sectors, 41 produce traded goods and 28 sectors  produce non-traded
goods. 5 In order to economize  on the number  of endogenous  variables  and allow  the equilibrium  to
be calculated  on an EXCEL  spreadsheet,  the 69 production  sectors were further aggregated  into a
19total of 9 domestic  production  sectors.  These  9 sectors are listed in Table 4, along with summary
statistics  indicating  the relative size, labor intensity, and trade pattern for the respective  industries.
The first 6 sectors produce traded goods. Of these traded goods, the trade data suggests  that Chile
has comparative  advantage  in the first three sectors: mining, agriculture, and food products. Exports
in each of these sectors represent  at least 10% of output, and imports  make up an insignificant  share
of local consumption. The mining sector alone accounts  for more than half of all exports, primarily
from copper. These exportable  sectors represent  slightly  more than a quarter of value added.
The next three sectors traded goods sectors, textiles,  machinery,  and other manufacturing,  are
primarily import-competing  sectors.  Imports in the latter two groups account  for more than three-
quarters of total imports. These sectors differ quite substantially  in their factor usage, so the impact
of trade liberalization  may well differ substantially  across these sectors. Textiles  are the most labor-
intensive  of these sectors, and use primarily  unskilled  labor.  The machinery  sector contains  a number
of high tech industries, while  the other manufacturing  sector is quite capital-intensive. The final three
sectors represent non-traded  goods: energy, services, and domestic transport. These sectors also
differ substantially  in factor usage, with energy  being the most capital-intensive  sector and services
the most labor-intensive  sector of all the 9 sectors.
The solutions  for the wage rate and non-traded  goods  prices in the full simulation  model are
reported in Tables 5 and 6.  Table 5 reports the solutions  for the wage rate and non-traded  goods
prices for NAFTA and MERCOSUR  tariff cuts under the assumption  that the elasticity  of substitution
between domestically  produced  goods and imports is 2.  The first column  reports the effect of
MERCOSUR  tariff cuts using the high values for the elasticity  of substitution  between imports  from
different countries.  Since all prices and the wage rate are unity in the initial situation, the solutions
for this case reflect a decline  in the wage rate of approximately  .7%.  Note that the numeraire  in this
exercise is the export price of traded goods, which is equal to unity throughout  the simulation. Since
20consumer  prices fall by approximately  1 percent, this results in a small increase in the real wage.
The domestic prices of the import-competing  goods showed  the largest decline among  the domestic
sectors, with reductions  of 1-1.6%.  Non-traded  goods fell by approximately  1%, while  prices of
exportables  declined  by about .5%.  The smaller reduction  in prices for exportables  is probably  due
to the fact that as domestic demand  declines, exportables  can be sold more readily in the world
market.  The lower portion of column 1 shows the effect of MERCOSUR  on sectoral employment
and capital returns under the high between-country  elasticity  assumption. The primary loser from
liberalization  is the textile sector, where capital  owners e-xperience  a loss in return of 1.6%.  The
mining sector is the primary gainer, with an increase in return of 1.27%. The major import-
competing  sectors and some of the non-traded  goods  sectors lose employment,  and there seems to be
a tendency  for the more labor intensive  sectors (as identified  in Table 4) to experience  larger losses.
Overall, tariff preferences  for MERCOSUR  countries  results in a small loss in aggregate  welfare (-
.168  %).
The second column  reports simulation  results for the case in which the elasticity  of
substitution  between source countries  takes the low value. In this case the loss in tariff revenue and
aggregate  welfare is smaller than in the high elasticity  case, which could  be interpreted  as resulting
from less trade diversion  when the elasticity  of substitution  is lower.  The price effects of
liberalization  are also lower in this case, although  the pattern of sectoral impacts  is the same.
The third and fourth columns  report results for Chile's entry into NAFTA. The declines in
consumer  prices and tariff revenue  are slightly larger than for the case of MERCOSUR,  which is
consistent  with the conclusion  of Section  I that NAFTA  would result in greater reductions  in prices of
importable  and greater declines in average  tariff rates. The major difference  in sectoral impacts seems
to be that agricultural  and food products  sectors do better under NAFTA  than under MERCOSUR.
As in the case of MERCOSUR,  the welfare  losses are smaller when the elasticity  of substitution
21between source countries is low.
The final column  of Table 5 reports the effect of a complete  elimination  of trade barriers.
Since  there is a uniform tariff in Chile in the initial situation,  the relative prices of imports from
different  countries are not affected  by a movement  to free trade and the result is independent  of the
assumption  made regarding  the elasticity  of substitution  between  source countries. Complete
elimination  of trade barriers raises the return to capital in mining  by more than 5  %, and causes the
return to capital in textiles to fall by 4.5%.  The directions of changes  in sectoral factor returns for a
movement  to free trade are generally  similar to those for NAFTA, but the magnitudes  are 2-3 times
larger for the free trade case.
Table 6 reports results under the assumption  that the elasticity  of substitution  between
domestic and imported goods is 4.  This higher elasticity  assumption  results in greater substitution
toward imported goods as a whole as a result of tariff reductions,  which can be thought  of as
additional  trade creation. This results in a greater benefit  from preferential  liberalization,  so that
NAFTA results in a very small welfare gain under the low between-source  country elasticity
assumption.  The sectoral impacts  of trade liberalization  are generally  larger for this case, particularly
for the machinery  sector where losses are nearly as large as those in the textile sector.
Overall, the following  conclusions  emerge from this simulation  concerning  the effects of
NAFTA and MERCOSUR  on Chile. First, the effects of eliminating  tariffs on either NAFTA or
MERCOSUR  members  has a very small impact on aggregate  welfare, and the effect could  be either
positive  or negative. The ambiguity  centers around the assumptions  made regarding the elasticity  of
substitution  between  source country  imports and the elasticity  of substitution  between domestic  goods
and imports. Increases  in the former elasticity  reduce  the benefits  obtained from preferential
relationship  because they increase  trade diversion,  while increases  in the latter elasticity raise the
benefits  of a preferential relation  because  they increase  trade creation.
22Second, the impact  of these trade agreements  on production  sectors are somewhat  more
significant,  and generally  similar across agreements. Under either agreement,  there is some flow of
labor out of import-competing  (primarily  textile  and machinery)  and non-traded  goods (services  and
transportation)  and into exportable  (mining  and food products)  sectors.  The major difference  between
the two agreements  seems to be that NAFTA  has a more favorable  impact on the agricultural  sector,
but a more unfavorable  effect on the other manufacturing  sector  (primarily  chemicals). This reflects
the differences  in comparative  advantage  of the NAFTA and MERCOSUR  countries.
Third, the sectoral effects of either of these agreements  is significantly  smaller than the one
that would result form a complete  elimination  of trade barriers. The negative  impact  on the textile
and machinery  sectors of free trade would  be several  times larger than that of either preferential
agreement  (even  under high assumptions  regarding  the degree of trade diversion),  probably  because of
the presence of important  suppliers in Europe  and Asia that would not be part of either preferential
arrangement.
It should  be emphasized  that the results reported above  do not include the gains to Chile
generated  by improvements  in the terms of trade resulting  from tariff cuts in partner countries. For
the case of NAFTA, suppose  we view the US domestic  price as being the world price of exports. A
reduction in the US tariff will allow Chile to sell its exports at the US domestic  price, which result in
a terms of trade improvement  for Chile.  Incorporation  of this effect is likely to increase the
attractiveness  of NAFTA relative  to MERCOSUR,  given  the greater size of the US market.  Effects
of this type could be incorporated  by utilizing  data on the tariffs faced by Chile in the partner market.
In the NAFTA case, it would seem reasonable  to model the terms of trade improvement  for Chile as
the amount  of the reduction  in the US tariff.  For Mercosur, where Chile is likely to have a
significant  impact  on prices in partner countries, it would be preferable  to endogenize  the prices in the
partner countries. For example,  Harrison, Rutherford,  and Tarr (1996)  find that the effects of
23access for Chile is sufficient  to make entry into NAFTA  desirable. Their conclusions  regarding the
effects of entry in to MERCOSUR  (with improved  market access  to partner countries)  were mixed,
with gains arising under some elasticity  assumptions  but not under others.'
III. Conclusions
This paper has presented  an index for aggregating  tariff data to use in the analysis  of
preferential  trading arrangements,  and illustrated  how the index can be combined  with a general
equilibrium  model of the domestic  economy  that can be run on an EXCEL spreadsheet. The
calculations  for the case of Chile suggest  that the index  is simple to calculate  due to its recursive
structure, which allows large amounts  of detailed  tariff line data to be aggregated  to be used with
domestic  production  data which is only available  at a much more aggregated  level. It was also found
that results using the tariff aggregators  may differ substantially  from those obtained  using simple
averages of tariff reductions. For example,  the reductions  in import  prices using the index were
ranged  from 10-30%  larger than those calculated  using a simple  average of tariffs, depending  on the
assumptions  made regarding  elasticity  of substitution  between  source countries. Furthermore,  there
were substantial  differences  between  the uniform  tariff rate equivalent  of the import price reduction
and the uniform  tariff rate equivalent  of the average tariff rate for industries. This means  that
ignoring  the information  available in tariff line data could  result in a substantial  overestimate  of the
average tariff rate on imports  when a preferential  reduction  is made.
The use of this tariff index  data in the spreadsheet  model for Chile indicated  that it is possible
to set up a general equilibrium  model using 9 domestic  sectors with a CES specification  of technology
and preferences  that can be solved easily  on an EXCEL  spreadsheet. The spreadsheet  model
produced  plausible results concerning  the effects of trade liberalization  on domestic  goods prices and
factor returns, and indicated  that the welfare  effects of the proposed  trade agreements  would have
aggregate  welfare consequences. In particular, the direction  of welfare change  depends on elasticities
24of  substitution  that correspond  approximnately  to notions of trade creation  and trade diversion.
The results of this work suggest  several directions  in which the work might be extended.
First, the tariff index could be extended  to incorporate  the role of quantitative  restrictions. If data on
the initial tariff-equivalents  of quantitative  restrictions  are available, then the initial levels of
restrictions  can be calculated  using the index. However, these levels of protection  will change  in
response  to changes in the level of protection  of other goods,  because the domestic  price of imported
goods is endogenous  for a small country in the presence  of quantitative  restrictions. Further work
exploring  ways in which this endogeneity  could be incorporated  into the index would be useful.
Second, it would be useful to be able to link spreadsheet  calculations  for different countries  in
order to be able to endogenize  some of the prices.  For example, in the MERCOSUR  case it would
be useful to be able to solve for some  prices within  MERCOSUR  countries  as part of the calculations,
since Chile's size relative to these countries  may be sufficient  to have an impact  on prices in these
markets. Finally, the general equilibrium  model  makes a specific factors  assumption  regarding
domestic  capital. It would  be useful to consider  the effects on domestic  production  of allowing
reallocation  of capital  between industries  over time.  Presumably,  this would lead to larger effects of
trade liberalization  on the composition  of domestic  production, and possibly also to larger welfare
effects of liberalization.
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26Endnotes
l.Corden (1984)  provides a survey of the customs  union literature, and documents  a number  of
attempts  to identify concepts  of "trade creation"  and "trade  diversion"  in specific  trade models.
2.The year 1986 was chosen  because it is the most recent year for which a comprehensive
input/output  table for the Chilean  economy  was available. The trade data for 1986 was used because
it was compatible  with the input/output  data.
3.  At the tariff line level, there are likely to be zero imports  from many countries. This is handled
by setting bii = 0 or qj =  °o for countries  that are not sources  of supply. In this case, we must have
the elasticity  of substitution  greater than 1 to yield a positive  value of Zi.
4.The assumptions  regarding oi and aij  were held constant  for the low elasticity  and high elasticity
assumptions. These elasticities  refer to substitution  between  products from different sub-industries
categories, and these values were chosen  to be consistent  with the assumptions  made regarding
substitution  between products in the domestic  production  model.
5.  The industry classification  used in the Chilean input/output  system  did not correspond  exactly  to
those used in SITC classifications,  so it was not possible  to match exactly  some of the sectors in the
input/output  table with those in the trade data.  To deal with this problem, several sectors in the
Chilean data were aggregated  to make them compatible  with SITC classifications. For example, it
could not determined  how the SITC classifications  of chemical  products should  be divided between
the "chemical  products" and "other chemical  products"  industries  in Chilean  data.  Therefore, the
industries  were combined  into a single  chemical  products industry. This process reduced  the total
number  of traded goods  sectors from 47 to 41.  A check on the quality of the match between  trade
data and the production  data was available  by comparing  the allocation  of imports  across sectors in
the trade data with that reported in the input/output  tables. The results indicated  a very close
association  between  trade shares using the trade data and that using the input/output  tables.
6. Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1996)  utilize a global general equilibrium  model  to calculate  the
effect of Chile's entry into various forms of preferential  trading arrangements. In the case where
Chile does not obtain preferred access  to partner markets, they reach a similar conclusion  to the
results of this paper regarding  Chile's entry into Mercosur  or Nafta. They find losses  for entry into
either arrangement,  with the magnitudes  being somewhat  larger than those found in this paper.  The
larger magnitude  of losses  appears to be related  to their assumption  of higher elasticities  of
substitution  between products from different  countries. Their high elasticity  assumption  uses a value
of 30, which is substantially  higher than existing  econometric  estimates,  and might be interpreted  as a
long run elasticity  of substitution.
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In this section  we present the market-clearing  conditions  which are required to solve for the
endogenous  variables in the spreadsheet  CGE model.
A. Production  Structure
A firm in a non-traded  goods sector  faces a given  output price pi and given  prices of inputs of
labor, w, capital, r;, and composite  intermediate  inputs, qji. Under the assumption  of constant  returns
to scale, the firm will choose its input usage to minimize  unit cost.  The CES production  function (7a)
has the associated  unit cost function
p  r. \1-o(  (A.1)
where ri is the cost of a unit of output  in sector i.  Since the industries  are assumed  to be perfectly
competitive,  pi  r=  in equilibrium.
A firm in a traded goods sector faces given  prices for domestic  sales, pd, and export sales,
P,i, and given input  prices w,  ri, and qji. The firm's profits will be
PdY& + NYxi  - WL 1 - riKi  - EqX  -
jeT,N
From the separability  of the production  function,  this optimization  problem can be decomposed  into
the two part optimization  problem:
(I)  mm  wL 1 + rxKi  +  S  qjiX
Kij-iXi  jeN.T
A-1subject  to  (bKiKi)  °I  on  +  y  0bi  lt;  2Y
(II)  max  PY 1i  + PdiYdi
Y.i'ydi
subject to  (Mdiydi)  i  + (MnYd)  ]  s  Yi
The firm's cost-minimization  problem (I) yields the unit cost function  Fi as in (A.  1) for the non-traded
sector.  The optimal solution  to the output  allocation  problem  (II) yields a revenue level p 1Yi, where
1+0  +a.~ 
Pi =  Pdi  )+  ( Px)  11 a1  for i E  T  (A.2)
is the unit value of the composite  output  good.  In a competitive  traded goods industry, rT  will equal
pi in equilibrium.
The unit cost functions  and unit revenue  functions  can now be used to derive the cost shares
of the respective  inputs and the revenue  shares of outputs in the traded goods industries. Defining  O,i
= qjiXji/piYi  to be the shares of costs of the intermediate  goods in total costs, we differentiate
can apply Shephard's lemma  to the unit cost function  ri to obtain  qji=  i  I  . Similar (j  bjTr)
expressions  can be derived for labor's share of total costs, oLi,  and capital's share of total costs, OK.
Following  the procedure  used in the aggregation  of imports, we normalize  all prices to unity in the
A-2initial situation, yielding (b,)a'1 =°  for j e T,N and j  = K,L.  The demands  for the inputs can thus
be expressed in terms of the cost shares as
8.  = 62(  = e  |  = 61.  0  for i,j  E  T, N  (A.3)
Similarly,  define pt.,  =  phYh/p 1Yi  to be the share of revenues  from sales in the k market (k = d,x) in
total revenue.  Differentiating  (A.2) with respect to the output  prices yields
1  _P  n  =  IA Pxi)  I  for i ET  (A.4)
where  go  =m  )  is the share of sales in the k market in the initial situation.
We now turn to the definition  of the intermediate  inputs. Intermediate  inputs of traded goods
may either be domestically  produced  or imported. In order to allow  for imperfect  substitutability
between  imported and domestic  intermediates,  we use the composite  intermediate  function  given by
(7b) in the text.  The unit price of a unit of the composite  input good will equal its unit cost, which is
the unit cost function for the function  (7b),
qj  = [t 4 ')-u + p0 (+)1~%]1.oi  for i E  T,N; j  E  T  (A.5)
where  °4  = bj  is the share of costs of inputs from source k (k = d,m) in total cost of inputs
from sector j used in sector i and ojj is the elasticity  of substitution  between  domestically  produced
and imported inputs. The price of imported  goods, 0,;, is the price index  obtained  from the
A-3aggregation  of tariff line data in Section  I.  Note that the input  prices q.i will be sector-specific,  in that
the shares of imported goods in the input  bundle and the composition  of the import bundle  may differ
across production  sectors.  Differentiating  (A.5), we obtain the shares of the respective  sources in
total purchases from sector  j to be
bdji =  f  PdjI  '  mji =  y  for i E  T,N; j  E  T  (A.6)
q%c 1jj)
The cost share of domestic  (imported)  intermediates  in total costs will thus be  ,djij  (PmjjOj)  . For
inputs purchased  from non-traded  goods industries,  the only source is domestic  firms so qji = pj for j
E  N and i E  T, N.
Equations  (A.  1) - (A.6) characterize  the profit-maximizing  choices  of input usage and output
composition  for firms in the traded and non-traded  goods  sectors.  These condition  can also be used
to solve for the equilibrium  returns to sector-specific  capital. Under the assumption  that firms in
sector i are perfectly  competitive,  pi =  ri and we can express  the total return to a unit of capital  as
ri  0  ______  1au  for i  E  T, N  (A.7)
Note that (A.6) captures the effect of changes  in the tariff structure  on the return to sector-specific
capital. The greater is the reduction in the price of imported  inputs resulting  from trade
liberalization,  as reflected  by changes  in , pji, the greater will be the increase  in return to capital.
Since ri =  1, Ki equals  the return to capital in the initial  situation  under this choice of units.
A-4B. Consumer Preferences  and the Domestic  Welfare  Index
The CES utility function  (8) has the associated  price index
c= 1 (P) ]  tc  (A.8a)
and
q.,  /\  a*11
11 ~ya- 0 (  )  ]7  for i c T  (A.8b)
Using Shepard's Lemma, we can express the budget shares in consumption  for non-traded  goods from
(A.8) to be
i  3P=  E  = cc  )c  i E  N  (A.9a)
For traded goods, we have the share of domestic  and imported  goods  in consumption  to be
qDL-d  1qi.  __a  Pi_1_  _  _iDmi  c  i E  T  (A.9b)
The budget constraint requires  that expenditure  equal the sum of factor incomes, borrowing
(B), and tariff revenue,
E  =  rKi  + wL + B  +  tP(Dm  +  E  Xi;)  (A.10)
ieT,N  ieTr  jeN,T
Since  the imported goods are composite  goods obtained  from aggregation  of the tariff data, the tariff
A-5rates, ti are the tariff indices  derived in Section  I.  From the definition  of the expenditure  function,
we have E =  4cU where Xc is the price index  in (A.8a).  Using  the demand function  for imported
consumption  goods (A.  10) and inputs ((A.2) and (A.4)), (A.  10) can be rewritten as
=wL  +  B  +  E  riKi[I  +  ~t.  (A.j1 ieN,T  [  jEM  toi) U=K  (A.ll )
+p-tia,,il
C. Market-Clearing  Conditions
The behavioral  relations derived  from the CES preferences  and technology  above can be
substituted  into the market-clearing  conditions  to yield solutions  for the impact  of changes in policy
on domestiz  prices  and  welfare. There  are  2(IN  +  IT) + 1 endogenous  prices:  IN  prices  of non-traded
goods, IN +  IT rental values on sector -specific  capital, IT  prices of traded goods sold in the domestic
market, and the wage rate.  In addition, the level of domestic  utility  must be derived.  The solutions
for the rental values ri are given by (A.7). In this section  we derive the remaining  market-clearing
conditions  for the labor market and markets for non-traded  goods that are required to solve the
general equilibrium  model.
The labor market equilibrium  requires  that the sum of the labor demands  across the IN +  IT
domestic production  sectors equal the exogenously  given labor supply, L.  The expenditure  on labor
in sector i can be expressed  as KYr,  (
0Li/  8'J.  Using  this expression,  we can write the labor market
equilibrium  as
TK.N  = WL  (A.12)
iE  TN  =Ki
A-6where factor returns  (A.7) and factor demands (A.2) can be substituted into (A. 12).
The demand for non-traded  goods  in sector i E  N is the sum of consumption  demand  and
intermediate  demand  from the domestic  production  sectors, which yields the market equilibrium
condition  Di + E  X,j = Yi  . Multiplying  both sides by pi, this condition  can be expressed  as
jeT,N
2E  r{°2  rLKi  fori  E  N  (A.13)
The demand  for non-traded  consumption  goods is given by (A.9), and the demand  for intermediate
inputs and the supply of non-traded  goods are obtained  from the factor demands  (A.2).  For traded
goods, the market-clearing  condition  requires  that demand  for domestically  produced  traded goods  by
households  and firms equal the supply  of output  to the domestic  market,  Dd(  + E  Xdij  = Ydi
jeT.N
Substituting from (A.9),  (A.2), (A.4) and (A.6) yields
adi  EKjK  j = rK  1 Ijdi  for i E  T  (A.14)
Equations  (A.7) and (A.  1  1)-(A. 14) are 2(IT  +  IN) + 2 equations  that can be solved on an EXCEL
spreadsheet  for the endogenous  variables ri (i E  N, T) , pi (i E  N), Pdi  (i  E  T) , w, and U.
A-7Node I: Industry Level Imports
Calculate Zb 4)t  t;
Using Zij, )  ij, tij
Node II: Subindustry Level Import
Calculate Z., 4)ij  ,tij
Using Zijk,  ijk, tijk
Node III: Tariff Lin  Level Im  rts
Aggregate Country/Groups to Thriff  Line
Calculate  Z-k, 
4 ijk, tijk
UsingZijkl  ijk,  tZi 
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Aggregate Country Data (Within  ariff)  t  Country Grou s
Calculate Zij  i,  tijk\
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Figure  2  Factor and Goods Flows with 2 Production SectorsEffects of Tariff Cuts to MERCOSUR Countries on hnport Prices
Commodity  Share  Base  New  ln(l+New)  InRelPri  InRelPri
of Import Rate  Average -In (l+Base)  Low Elas  High Elas
Rate
non-elec mach  0.165  0.11  0.102  -0.008  -0.009  -0.014
chemicals  0.132  0.11  0.098  -0.011  -0.012  -0.017
elecmach  0.109  0.11  0.100  -0.009  -0.011  -0.017
oilandgas  0.094  0.11  0.110  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000
basic metals  0.085  0.11  0.089  -0.019  -0.022  -0.030
transp equip  0.077  0.11  0.082  -0.025  -0.028  -0.036
textilemfg  0.064  0.11  0.081  -0.026  -0.029  -0.039
plastic prod  0.044  0.11  0.087  -0.020  -0.024  -0.032
scientific equip  0.039  0.11  0.099  -0.010  -0.012  -0.017
petro prod  0.032  0.11  0.104  -0.005  -0.006  -0.007
ag  0.028  0.11  0.081  -0.027  -0.029  -0.033
paper prod  0.022  0.11  0.081  -0.026  -0.030  -0.039
rubber  0.021  0.11  0.090  -0.018  -0.021  -0.030
othermfg  0.014  0.11  0.102  -0.008  -0.009  -0.014
coal  0.011  0.11  0.110  -0.000  0.000  0.000
Average  0.11  0.094  -0.014  -0.016  -0.022
Uniform Tariff Equivalent  0.11  0.094  0.092  0.086
Table 1Effects of entry into NAFTA on Import Prices
Commodity  Share  Base  New  In (BASE)  In Rel Pri  In Ret Price
of  Imports  Rate  Average  -ln(NEW)  Low Elas  High Elas
Rate
non-elec mach  0.165  0.11  0.079  -0.028  -0.032  -0.044
chemicals  0.132  0.11  0.066  -0.041  -0.044  -0.053
elec mach  0.109  0.11  0.074  -0.033  -0.037  -0.047
oil and gas  0.094  0.11  0.110  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000
basic metals  0.085  0.11  0.091  -0.018  -0.021  -0.029
transp equip  0.077  0.11  0.096  -0.013  -0.015  -0.023
textile mfg  0.064  0.11  0.089  -0.019  -0.022  -0.030
plastic prod  0.044  0.11  0.079  -0.028  -0.033  -0.045
scientific equip  0.039  0.11  0.075  -0.032  -0.036  -0.047
petro prod  0.032  0.11  0.084  -0.024  -0.028  -0.040
ag  0.028  0.11  0.070  -0.036  -0.038  -0.041
paper prod  0.022  0.11  0.089  -0.019  -0.022  -0.031
rubber  0.021  0.11  0.089  -0.019  -0.022  -0.030
other mfg  0.014  0.11  0.067  -0.040  -0.044  -0.053
coal  0.011  0.11  0.056  -0.050  -0.055  -0.065
Average  0.110  0.083  -0.025  -0.028  -0.036
Uniform Tariff Equivalent  0.110  0.083  0.080  0.070
Table 2Average  Tariff Rates
Commodity  Share  Old  MERCOSUR MERCOSUR NAFTA  NAFTA
of Imports  Tariff  Low Elas  High  Elas  Low Elas High  Elas
non-elec  mach  0.165  0.099  0.089  0.077  0.066  0.044
chemicals  0.132  0.099  0.086  0.076  0.055  0.038
elec mach  0.109  0.099  0.088  0.074  0.062  0.042
oil and gas  0.094  0.099  0.099  0.099  0.099  0.099
basic  metals  0.085  0.099  0.077  0.059  0.078  0.060
transp equip  0.077  0.099  0.070  0.055  0.083  0.067
textile  mfg  0.064  0.099  0.069  0.051  0.076  0.060
plastic  prod  0.044  0.099  0.075  0.057  0.065  0.040
scientific  equip  0.039  0.099  0.087  0.076  0.062  0.041
petro prod  0.032  0.099  0.093  0.091  0.070  0.046
ag  0.028  0.099  0.070  0.063  0.062  0.057
paper prod  0.022  0.099  0.069  0.051  0.076  0.058
rubber  0.021  0.099  0.077  0.058  0.076  0.059
other mfg  0.014  0.099  0.089  0.077  0.055  0.037
coal  0.011.  0.099  0.099  0.099  0.044  0.027
Average  0.099  0.082  0.071  0.071  0.054
Uniform  Tariff  Equivalent  0.11  0.090  0.076  0.076  0.057
Table 3Characteristics  of Domestic  Production  Sectors  for Chile
Share of  Exports /  Imports/  Imported I Final Import Wages/
Value Added Gross Outpu Gross Outpu Gross Out  Consumptio Value Ad
Agriculture  0.096  0.169  0.032  0.065  0.032  0.273
Mining  0.111  0.709  0.131  0.096  0.041  0.294
Food Products  0.055  0.181  0.041  0.071  0.022  0.363
Textiles/Footwear  0.023  0.009  0.242  0.194  0.133  0.433
Metals & Machinery  0.032  0.086  1.342  0.198  0.747  0.381
Other Manufacturing  0.082  0.122  0.375  0.241  0.073  0.308
International Transp  0.015  0.611  0.106  0.395
Energy  0.041  0.016  0.182
Services  0.438  0.031  0.480
Domestic Transport  0.110  0.065  0.363
0.084
Table  4Simulation  Results: Elasticty of Substitution  Between Domestic and hnports =2
MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR  NAFTA  NAFTA  Free Trade
High Elas  Low Elas  High Ela Low Elas
Wage  0.993  0.996  0.995  0.998  0.985
Price of Ag  0.994  0.996  0.996  0.997  0.980
Price of Minerals  0.997  0.998  0.998  0.999  0.984
Price of Food Products  0.989  0.993  0.992  0.995  0.968
Price of Textiles  0.984  0.989  0.983  0.988  0.950
Price of Machinery  0.987  0.992  0.985  0.989  0.951
Price of Other Mfg.  0.991  0.994  0.988  0.991  0.954
Price of Energy  0.991  0.995  0.990  0.995  0.973
Price of Services  0.990  0.994  0.989  0.993  0.966
Price of Transport  0.989  0.993  0.988  0.992  0.963
Old Tariff Revenue  78272  78272  78272  78272  78272
New Tariff Revenue  56705  65703  43209  56297  0
% Change in Welfare  -0.168  -0.010  -0.214  -0.002  0.155
%Ernployment  Change in:
Agriculture  0.642  0.368  1.166  0.722  2.086
Mining  1.743  1.033  2.116  1.323  5.829
Food Products  0.411  0.251  1.042  0.694  1.505
Textiles/Footwear  -0.873  -0.617  -0.694  -0.454  -2.700
Metals & Machinery  -0.139  -0.156  0.195  0.047  -1.238
Other Manufacturing  0.218  0.100  0.565  0.317  1.129
Energy  0.039  0.025  -0.020  -0.011  0.098
Services  -0.381  -0.217  -0.616  -0.378  -1.365
Domestic Transport  -0.305  -0.172  -0.512  -0.313  -1.095
% Change in Capital Return:
Agriculture  0.043  0.055  0.821  0.610  0.851
Mining  1.266  0.795  1.876  1.278  5.010
Food Products  -0.214  -0.075  0.683  0.580  0.206
Textiles/Footwear  -1.640  -1.038  -1.246  -0.696  -4.466
Metals & Machinery  -0.825  -0.527  -0.258  -0.139  -2.842
Other Manufacturing  -0.428  -0.243  0.152  0.161  -0.212
Energy  -0.627  -0.325  -0.498  -0.203  -1.358
Services  -1.094  -0.594  -1.160  -0.612  -2.982
Domestic Transport  -1.010  -0.544  -1.044  -0.540  -2.682
% Change in Consumer Pri  -1.089  -0.684  -1.239  -0.803  -3.817
Table 5Simulation  Results: Elasticity of Substitution  Between Domestic and Imports =4
MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR  NAFTA  NAFTA  Free Trade
High Elas  Low Elas  High Elas  Low Elas
Wage  0.991  0.995  0.993  0.996  0.977
Price of Ag  0.991  0.994  0.995  0.996  0.972
Price of Minerals  0.997  0.998  0.997  0.997  0.972
Price of Food Products  0.986  0.990  0.990  0.993  0.959
Price of Textiles  0.980  0.986  0.981  0.987  0.939
Price of Machinery  0.984  0.989  0.980  0.985  0.935
Price of Other Mfg.  0.989  0.992  0.983  0.988  0.942
Price of Energy  0.989  0.993  0.988  0.993  0.964
Price of Services  0.988  0.992  0.986  0.991  0.957
Price of Transport  0.987  0.991  0.985  0.990  0.954
Old Tariff Revenue  78272  78272  78272  78272  78272
New Tariff Revenue  56928  65943  43734  56902  0
%Change in Welfare  -0.158  0.000  -0.188  0.024  0.199
%Employment Change in:
Agriculture  0.663  0.360  1.407  0.892  2.499
Mining  2.142  1.368  2.559  1.669  7.101
Food Products  0.309  0.134  1.352  0.946  1.973
Textiles/Footwear  -1.532  -1.153  -0.838  -0.578  -4.400
Metals & Machinery  -0.620  -0.499  -0.749  -0.662  -3.729
Other Manufacturing  0.053  -0.031  -0.227  -0.331  -0.116
Energy  0.085  0.065  0.015  0.018  0.214
Services  -0.377  -0.213  -0.611  -0.370  -1.376
Domestic Transport  -0.287  -0.156  -0.499  -0.300  -1.064
% Change in Capital Return:
Agriculture  -0.159  -0.144  0.860  0.618  0.459
Mining  1.485  0.976  2.140  1.482  5.573
Food Products  -0.551  -0.395  0.799  0.678  -0.125
Textiles/Footwear  -2.597  -1.825  -1.635  -1.015  -7.206
Metals & Machinery  -1.584  -1.099  -1.536  -1.109  -6.460
Other Manufacturing  -0.836  -0.579  -0.955  -0.741  -2.446
Energy  -0.801  -0.472  -0.687  -0.353  -2.079
Services  -1.314  -0.780  -1.382  -0.784  -3.845
Domestic Transport  -1.214  -0.718  -1.259  -0.707  -3.499
% Change in Consumer Pri  -1.302  -0.866  -1.468  -0.985  -4.680
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